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Abstract
Game theory is the mathematical study of strategic decision making in situa-
tions of conflict. In game theory, a single interaction is defined as a game, and
those involved in the decision-making are called the players, who are assumed to act
rationally. We will explore the basic ideas of game theory, including the ideas of
payoffs and outcomes; classification of games as zero-sum or nonzero-sum; types of
strategies and counterstrategies and the idea of dominance.
Game theory has many applications in subjects such as economics, international
relations and politics, and psychology as it can be used to analyze and predict the
behavior and decisions of the players. We will apply game theory to the decisions
made by the players during the Triwizard Tournament in Harry Potter and the
Goblet of Fire.
3
1 Introduction
Game theory is the mathematical study of strategic decision making. It can be used to
analyze the options, motivations, and rewards involved in a decision. This paper will
discuss some of the basic concepts and modeling tools of game theory. We will also give
examples of famous and common applications of game theory. Game theory is widely
applied in the real world. Major areas of application include economics, diplomacy, and
military strategy. Game theory can also be applied in fields such as psychology, biology,
political science, computer science, sociology, and more.
2 The Basics of Game Theory
2.1 Definitions and Zero-Sum Games
Game theory is a branch of mathematics that analyzes interactions involving strategic
decision making. Any such interaction is called a game. The parties involved in the
game are the players, who can be individuals or groups. The players are assumed to
act rationally. A rational player is one who makes decisions based on what will give
themselves the greatest benefit. In game theoretical terms, a rational player maximizes
their own payoff, a concept we will discuss in more depth later. One type of game is
classified as zero-sum. A zero-sum game is one in which one player’s gain causes the other
player’s loss of an equal magnitude.
Games in which two players have m and n options, respectively, can be represented
by an m × n matrix. For example, a simple game consisting of two players where each
has two options can be represented by a 2× 2 matrix, as shown in Figure 1. We can let
player one’s options be represented by the rows, and player two’s options be represented
by the columns. The entries of the matrix contain possible outcomes of the game. The
outcome of a single game is the entry in which the row of player one’s decision and the
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column of player two’s decision meet. For example, if each player chooses option 1, the
outcome of the game is the entry in position (1, 1) of the matrix representing the game.
Player Two
Option 1 Option 2
Player
One
Option 1
Outcome if
each chooses
option 1
P1 chooses 1,
P2 chooses 2
Option 2 P1 chooses 1,
P2 chooses 2
Outcome if
each chooses
option 2
Figure 1: The general form of a payoff matrix for a two person zero-sum game.
One simple example of a game that can be modeled with a payoff matrix is Penny
Matching [1]. Two players each have a penny. They display their pennies simultaneously,
with either heads or tails facing up. If both players’ pennies match, i.e., both are heads-up
or both are tails-up, player one gets both pennies. If they display opposite faces, player
two gets both pennies.
Player Two
Heads Tails
Player Heads 1 −1
One Tails −1 1
Figure 2: The payoff matrix for Penny Matching from the perspective of player one.
As shown in Figure 2, we can construct the matrix for this zero-sum game from
the perspective of player one. That is, an entry of 1 is a gain of one penny for player one
and −1 is a loss of one penny for player one. This gain or loss of one penny represents
player one’s payoff. While it may be intuitive to think of players’ payoffs as monetary,
this is not necessarily the case. Payoff is formally defined as the player’s utility gained
in an outcome. It could be money, but it could also be cups of coffee or pairs of socks
or anything else the player might gain from a given outcome. Utility that is difficult to
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quantify can also be numerically represented. For example, if a player valued one outcome
twice as much as another, the outcomes could be expressed as 2 and 1, respectively.
The matrix could also be constructed from the perspective of player two; in this
case, the positive and negative 1s would simply be switched to display player two’s pay-
offs in each possible scenario. Throughout this paper, matrices for zero-sum games will
be constructed in terms of payoff for player one, that is, the player whose choices are
represented by the rows, unless otherwise stated.
2.2 Nonzero-sum Games
A nonzero-sum game is where one player’s gain does not strictly imply another player’s
loss. This means that outcomes cannot be expressed by only one number; rather, the
outcomes of two person nonzero-sum games can be expressed as an ordered pair. The
first number of the ordered pair represents the payoff to player one for a given outcome,
and the second number represents the payoff to player two. These games can still be
represented with a matrix, as shown in Figure 3. In the interest of brevity, we can denote
player one’s outcomes by a, and player two’s outcomes by b.
Player Two
Option 1 Option 2
Player Option 1 (a1, b1) (a1, b2)
One Option 2 (a2, b1) (a2, b2)
Figure 3: The general form of a payoff matrix for a two person, nonzero-sum game.
2.3 Strategies and Expected Payoff
A player’s strategy is defined as the frequency with which he or she chooses each of the
options available to him or her. For a two person, zero sum game, a player’s strategy is
denoted [1− p, p]. For the example of Penny Matching, if a player chooses heads or tails
with equal probability, this strategy is expressed [.5, .5].
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The expected payoff for a player can be calculated if we know each player’s strategy.
The expected payoff is similar to the concept of expected value in probability. To find
expected payoff, we multiply each payoff by the probability of that payoff occurring, and
sum all these together. For Penny Matching, we can find player one’s expected payoff as
follows:
.5× .5× 1 + .5× .5× (−1) + .5× .5× 1 + .5× .5× (−1) = 0 (1)
This makes sense because if each player chooses heads or tails with equal frequency,
we would expect player one to win exactly half the games (and therefore lose half the games
as well).
2.3.1 Optimizing Payoff
If one player’s strategy is known by the other, the other player can use this information
to decide what strategy to use to produce the greatest payoff. For a simple example,
consider the game Rock, Paper, Scissors. In this game, two players simultaneously show
rock, paper, or scissors. Rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock.
If you were playing Rock, Paper, Scissors and you knew your competitor favored paper
over the other two options, you would choose scissors more often. In fact, your optimal
strategy would be to choose scissors 100% of the time. Then, your strategy for Rock,
Paper, Scissors would be expressed as [0, 0, 1]. A strategy where a player chooses one
option 100% of the time is called a pure strategy. Conversely, a mixed strategy is one
where options have differing probabilities of being chosen. According to Theorem 1 in A
Gentle Introduction to Game Theory, if one player of a game employs a fixed strategy,
then the opponent has an optimal counterstrategy that is pure [1].
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2.4 Maximin and Minimax Strategies
Themaximin andminimax strategies involve essentially choosing the option with the “best
worst case scenario.” These ideas are among the first ever considered in game theory, as
British ambassador James Waldegrave found a minimax solution for two-person games in
1713 [2].
2.4.1 Maximin: determining a strategy for player one
As discussed above, there is a pure strategy that is best for player two if player one’s
strategy is fixed. However, player one can incorporate this into their choice of strategy,
anticipating what player two will choose. For a given strategy of player one, player two
will choose the option that yields player one the least possible benefit. With this in mind,
player one can choose the strategy that has the greatest minimum payoff. Player one
would consider the payoffs for every possible pure strategy of player two. Figure 4 shows
the two matrices representing the possible outcomes from player two’s two pure strategies.
Player Two Player Two
1 0 0 1
Player 1− p a b Player 1− p a b
One p c d One p c d
Figure 4: Payoff matrices for player two’s two possible pure strategies.
We can compute player one’s expected payoff for each scenario. Player one’s strat-
egy can be denoted [1 − p, p]. Equation 2 gives the expected payoff to player one when
player two’s strategy is [1, 0], and Equation 3 gives the expected payoff when player two’s
strategy is [0, 1].
(1− p)× 1× a+ p× 1× c = (c− a)p+ a (2)
(1− p)× 1× b+ p× 1× d = (d− b)p+ b (3)
Because a, b, c, and d are constants, the best strategy for player one can be
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determined from Equations 2 and 3. The actual outcome will be the smaller of these
two results, because player two will choose the option that minimizes player one’s payoff.
Effectively, player one is able to secure a guaranteed minimum payoff.
We can find a maximin strategy for player one in Penny Matching [1]. Recall the
payoff matrix from the perspective of player one, as shown in Figure 2. We can substitute
the values of this matrix into Equations 2 and 3. From the payoff matrix, a = d = 1 and
b = c = −1. Equations 4 and 5 give the two possible payoffs to player one when player
two’s strategy is [1, 0] and [0, 1], respectively. Player one’s strategy is denoted [1 − p, p],
0 ≤ p ≤ 1. In words, Equation 4 gives the payoff to player one when player two only
displays heads, and Equation 5 gives the payoff when player two only displays tails. Player
one displays tails with probability p.
(1− p)× 1× 1 + p× 1×−1 = (−1− 1)p+ 1 = −2p+ 1 (4)
(1− p)× 1×−1 + p× 1× 1 = (1− (−1))p− 1 = 2p− 1 (5)
We can then graph Equations 4 and 5 to help determine the optimal strategy for
player one, as shown in Figure 5 [1].
Player two will choose the strategy that gives the lower payoff to player one, so
player one’s expected payoff will be on the bolded line, with the exact value dependent on
their choice of p. From this, we can see that player one’s best expected payoff is 0, which
is obtained by the strategy [.5, .5]. Intuitively, this makes sense. If player one were to
display heads more than tails, for example, player two would respond by always displaying
heads, which gives the advantage to player two. If player one employs strategy [.5, .5],
their expected payoff is 0 regardless of which pure strategy player two chooses.
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Figure 5: A graph of player one’s expected payoff.
2.4.2 Minimax: determining a strategy for player two
The minimax strategy is the best strategy for player two, as opposed to player one.
While both the minimax and maximin strategies have the same general idea, the minimax
strategy determines player two’s optimal strategy [1 − q, q] considering the outcomes of
player one’s two pure strategies. Because the outcomes in the matrix describe the payoff
to player one, player two knows player one will choose the strategy that gives the highest
of the two possible payoffs. Effectively, player two wants to choose a strategy [1−q, q] that
gives the “smallest maximum” because player one will choose the strategy with maximum
payoff. The two possible matrices are shown in Figure 6.
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Player Two Player Two
1− q q 1− q q
Player 1 a b Player 0 a b
One 0 c d One 1 c d
Figure 6: Payoff matrices for player one’s two possible pure strategies.
We can also compute player one’s two expected payoffs with this matrix, as shown
in Equations 6 and 7.
1× (1− q)× a+ 1× q × b = (b− a)q + a (6)
1× (1− q)× c+ 1× q × d = (d− c)q + c (7)
Payoff is dependent on player two’s strategy, denoted [1−q, q]. For a given strategy
of player two, the actual payoff to player one will be the higher result of those given by
Equations 6 and 7. This is because, of the two choices available, player one will choose
the option with the higher payoff. Player two is able to choose a strategy that places a
guaranteed upper limit on player one’s payoff.
2.5 Dominance
While we have so far focused on games represented by 2 × 2 matrices, matrices for two
person games can have any dimension depending on how many options each player has.
In such cases, it may seem more complicated to determine the best move for either player
because there are more options, but in some of these cases we can eliminate one or more
options. We say option i dominates option j if, for all possible outcomes of choosing j,
the possible outcomes of choosing i are higher. In words, for every potential outcome in
a row or column, the potential outcomes in another row or column are higher.
Consider the game represented by the matrix in Figure 7, where each of the two
players have three options. Of player one’s three options, option 3 has a better outcome
than option 2 regardless of the choice player two makes. Therefore, we can remove the
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second row from the matrix because player one would never choose that option when
acting rationally. This step is shown in Figure 8.
Player Two
Player
One
−3 3 4
2 −4 1
3 −2 2
Figure 7: A two person game where each player has three options.
Player Two
−3 3 4 Player Two
Player 2 −4 1 Player −3 3 4
One 3 −2 2 One 3 −2 2
Figure 8: The matrix after removing player one’s dominated option.
Now we have a 2 × 3 matrix representing the game. We can also eliminate one
of player two’s options. Here it is important to recall that the entries of this matrix are
the payoffs to player one for every given outcome. This means that when player two is
deciding the best option, they would choose the option that is consistently lower because
less gain for player one means more gain for player two. Then option 2 dominates option
3, and we can remove the rightmost column from the matrix. Figure 9 shows this step
and the final result, which is much easier to work with than the original matrix.
Player Two Player Two
Player −3 3 4 Player −3 3
One 3 −2 2 One 3 −2
Figure 9: The matrix after removing player two’s dominated option.
2.6 Nash Equilibria
In nonzero-sum games, a Nash Equilibrium occurs when each player individually cannot
increase their expected payoff by switching to a different strategy. These strategies can be
either pure or mixed. The concept of Nash Equilibrium is so named because John Nash
12
proved that every two-person game contains a minimum of one equilibrium, whether it
is a combination of mixed or pure strategies. Some games, especially those where each
player has more choices, have multiple Nash Equilibria. Figure 10 shows a matrix of a
nonzero-sum game with one Nash Equilibrium.
Player Two
Option 1 Option 2
Player Option 1 (-1, -1) (-3,0)
One Option 2 (0, -3) (-2,-2)
Figure 10: A game matrix with a Nash Equilibrium in position (2, 2).
Nash Equilibria can be determined by finding the entries (a, b) of the payoff matrix
such that a is the maximum value for its column and b is the maximum value for its row.
This method works because each player is guaranteed not to regret their decision, given
the decision of the other player. In the game in Figure 10, the outcome (−2,−2) is
a Nash Equilibrium because neither player could get a better outcome by individually
changing their choice; if either player one or player two switched, their payoffs would
decrease to −3. This method works if a Nash Equilibrium is pure, meaning that each
player employs a pure strategy to obtain the outcome of the Nash Equilibrium. For games
without a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, determining the mixed strategy solution is less
straightforward.
Interestingly, it is clear that both players would have a better outcome if each chose
option 1. We say an outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no outcome with better payoffs
for all players. Sometimes the equilibrium outcome is not Pareto optimal, as in the case
of the game in Figure 10. When this occurs, we call the outcome Pareto inefficient or
Pareto inferior. Figure 11 shows a matrix of a game with an equilibrium that is Pareto
optimal [3]. In this matrix, there is another Nash Equilibrium with outcomes (2, 1) in
position (2, 2), but it is not Pareto optimal because player two has a better outcome in
the other equilibrium point.
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Player Two
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Player
One
Option 1 (0, -1) (0, 2) (2, 3)
Option 2 (0, 0) (2, 1) (1, -1)
Option 3 (2, 2) (1, 4) (1, -1)
Figure 11: A game matrix with a Pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium in position (1, 3).
2.7 Cooperation
Up to this point, we have assumed that all players make decisions simultaneously and
independently. We have also assumed their sole motivation is to maximize their own
payoff (or minimize the opponent’s payoff), and that play occurs exactly once. However,
when games are played repeatedly, the phenomenon of cooperation emerges.
Cooperation can take many forms and arise from different motivations. One such
form is essentially the Golden Rule: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
If I cooperate today, you might be more likely to cooperate with me in the future. Another
form of cooperation is less optimistic, and based on retaliation. This means that a party
would make their decision of whether to cooperate based on whether their opponent had
cooperated in the past.
In order for cooperation to be a viable solution, there must be trust between the
players. It is often the case that if only one player were to cooperate, they would suffer
a great loss whereas the defecting player, that is, the one who betrays the other, would
benefit. Thus, if there is not enough trust between the two parties, mutual cooperation is
all but impossible. This idea can be extended to many real-world applications, such as in
international relations. In these situations, if the two parties could only cooperate both
would have a better outcome. This is also seen in the game in the previous section, in
Figure 10, as well as the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma, which will be discussed in Section
4.
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3 History
Game theoretical concepts have been utilized to analyze problems for millennia, long
before game theory was a formally-defined field. One interesting example is that the Tal-
mud, the Jewish holy book that provides the basis for Jewish law, prescribes solutions
for allocation of disputed resources that confounded scholars until the 1980s when math-
ematicians Robert Aumann and Michael Maschler solved the problem using the tools of
modern game theory. As it turns out, the solution given by the Talmud is to split the
disputed amount equally [4]. Another example is when James Madison considered the ef-
fects of different taxation systems with game theoretical concepts [2]. The list goes on, as
conflict resolution and strategic decision-making have been important issues throughout
all of human history.
The first work that brought about game theory as a formal field of mathematics
was Hungarian mathematician John von Neumann’s paper The Theory of Games in 1928
[5]. This paper had three major results. The first was reducing a game to the cases where
each player knows either everything or nothing about the other player’s previous moves.
He also proved the minimax theorem for two person zero-sum games, and he analyzed
three person zero-sum games [5].
Economist Oskar Morgenstern connected with von Neumann in 1938, and the
two then worked together on Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in
1944. This work was huge in the development of game theory. They expanded on von
Neumann’s previous work with an in-depth analysis of situations where players have only
partial knowledge of other players’ previous decisions, whereas The Theory of Games made
the assumption that players knew either everything or nothing about previous decisions.
They also expanded the definition of payoffs; previously payoffs were generally considered
to be only monetary, but von Neumann and Morgenstern developed the theory of utility,
which is still used today in many fields such as economics [5].
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern laid the foundation for game theory, it has
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been added to by many mathematicians, such as John Nash in the 1950s. However, the
main development over the following decades was increasingly widespread application to
many fields. While certainly important in the field of economics, the use of game theory
has expanded to extensive use in biology, and it is also very important to the development
of military strategy. Interestingly, the five game theorists who have won the Nobel Prize
for economics also worked as advisors to the Pentagon over the courses of their careers
[6]. Game theory has also been applied in fields such as computer science and moral
philosophy [2].
4 More Examples of Games
As mentioned previously, game theory is applicable in many fields. This section will
discuss some specific examples of game theory at work. For an easy and fun read about
applications of game theory, see Fisher’s Rock, Paper, Scissors: Game Theory in Everyday
Life [6].
4.1 The Prisoner’s Dilemma
One of the most famous problems of game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a nonzero-
sum game. The setup is as follows: two people are arrested for a crime, but there is not
enough evidence to press charges. The police separate them for interrogation, and they
have not worked out a story to tell beforehand. The decision before each of them is to
either tell the police everything or to keep quiet. In game theoretical terms, they can
either defect or cooperate. Cooperating means keeping quiet for this example, termed so
because they are cooperating with each other. Defecting means to talk to the police. If
both cooperate, then both will serve short sentences. If only one defects, the defector will
be released and the other person will have a longer sentence. If both defect, then each
is penalized, but to a lesser extent than if only the other person had defected. A payoff
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matrix can be constructed for the situation, as shown in Figure 12.
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (-5, -5) (-15, 0)
Defect (0, -15) (-10, -10)
Figure 12: A payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Even though it is clear that the best outcome is achieved if both cooperate, if the
game is played exactly once the rational outcome is for both to defect. This is because
there is a Nash Equilibrium at (−10,−10) in the payoff matrix. In each player’s case,
regardless of whether the other player cooperates or defects, their better option is to
defect. This is an example where the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal.
4.2 Chicken
Another game that can be analyzed is Chicken, where two players are moving toward
each other until they either crash or one moves out of the way. The payoffs are difficult to
quantify if one or both players move because all that is gained by not crashing is glory or
embarrassment for the winner or loser, respectively. However, if neither player moves, the
payoff is certainly negative for both. This makes Chicken a nonzero-sum game because
one player’s loss is not necessarily the other’s gain.
One example of real-life Chicken was the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, the USSR
attempted to build a missile base in Cuba, which is only 90 miles away from the US. The
US set up a naval blockade to prevent supply ships coming in, so there was essentially
a standoff for a few weeks before the USSR backed down. In game theoretical terms,
the US and USSR (the players) each had the two possible strategies of proceed or back
down. This example is very illustrative of how the payoffs when one or both players
back down are not necessarily quantifiable. These outcomes are nonetheless important,
however, especially in the context of the Cold War. On the other hand, if neither party
had backed down, the result could very well have been the strongly negative outcome of
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nuclear annihilation.
4.3 Tragedy of the Commons: the St. Catherine University Cafe-
teria
You may have noticed that every May our Sodexo overlords beg in vain for the St. Cather-
ine University student body to return the silverware and plates that were taken throughout
the year. “How can this really matter?” you might wonder. Surely a giant company such
as this isn’t taking a hit just because you’ve pocketed a few forks over the semester. While
Sodexo is in all likelihood doing fine, this is actually an example of a phenomenon called
Tragedy of the Commons [6]. Individual students rationally decide that if they take a fork
home with them, the benefit to them is far greater than the loss to the university because
the cafeteria has so many forks to begin with. However, when we all do this, there may
actually be a shortage of utensils by the end of the year.
This is certainly an example of Tragedy of the Commons that is relatively unim-
portant in the grand scheme of things. Perhaps the disgruntled student body derives a
sense of vigilante justice from this large-scale utensil thievery, an intangible payoff that
may be even greater than Sodexo’s loss. However, this phenomenon plays out in many
other, more serious real-world examples, especially in relation to resource consumption.
Whether it is forestry, driving an inefficient vehicle or unnecessary driving, or choosing not
to recycle just this one time, countless seemingly isolated decisions add up to collectively
create a large impact.
4.4 Rock, Paper, Scissors
Rock, Paper, Scissors, described in Section 2.3.1, is a very well-known zero-sum game.
As you may have learned from playing in your childhood, the best strategy is [1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
], or
choosing each option with equal probability. As mentioned previously, if a player knows
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the other player is likely to choose one option, say scissors, more often than the others,
they would simply switch their strategy to choosing rock 100% of the time. We can even
construct a matrix to simulate Rock, Paper, Scissors, as shown in Figure 13.
Player Two
Rock Paper Scissors
Player
One
Rock 0 −1 1
Paper 1 0 −1
Scissors −1 1 0
Figure 13: A payoff matrix for Rock, Paper, Scissors.
While it is intuitively and mathematically true that one should display each option
with equal probability, in practice true randomness is nearly impossible for humans to
achieve. Interestingly, in tournament play, it has been observed that scissors is only
displayed 29.6% of the time [6]. To clarify, this does not mean that if you enter a Rock,
Paper, Scissors tournament you should only play rock because in that case your opponent
would quickly catch on and cover you with paper. Rather, the pure strategy response is
only a viable option if your opponent’s strategy is fixed. In real life, repeated gameplay
strategies change frequently in response to what the other player is perceived to be doing.
5 The Triwizard Tournament
The Triwizard Tournament is the main event of Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire
[7]. In a tradition that began seven hundred years ago, the three wizarding schools of
Hogwarts, Durmstrang, and Beauxbatons come together to compete. One student is to be
chosen to represent each school in the tournament, which consists of three difficult tasks.
Naturally, the process does not go as planned. The Goblet of Fire, which chooses the
competitors, is bewitched to choose Harry in addition to the three it chooses as it should,
so Hogwarts is represented by both Harry Potter and Cedric Diggory in the tournament.
The Goblet of Fire chooses Viktor Krum to represent Durmstrang, and Fleur Delacour is
the Beauxbatons champion.
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Throughout the course of the tournament, countless decisions are made. As game
theory is the analysis of strategic decision-making, there are certainly numerous aspects
of the tournament that could be considered through a game theoretical lens. However,
this application will focus on cooperation between the players.
5.1 Cooperation in the Triwizard Tournament
We see much cooperation between Harry and the other players during the Triwizard
Tournament. One specific example of this is the exchange of information between Harry
and Cedric. Thanks to Hagrid, the Hogwarts gamekeeper, Harry learns that the first task
will involve facing a dragon. Hagrid brings the Beauxbatons headmistress into the forest
to see the dragons, and Harry runs into the Durmstrang headmaster as he is sneaking
back to the castle. This leads Harry to assume that both Fleur and Krum will know about
the task ahead of time. Then Cedric, it is assumed, is the only competitor who doesn’t
know what is coming.
In this “game,” the players are Harry and Cedric. We will exclude all other charac-
ters. Voldemort may be orchestrating everything from Harry’s entrance in the tournament
to his success in the tasks, but Harry does not yet know this. We can also exclude the
other two champions for simplicity.
Harry could have kept the information of the first task to himself, which would
have given him a huge advantage over Cedric. However, Harry’s payoff in this situation is
not the thousand-galleon prize for winning the tournament he didn’t even want to enter.
Rather, his decision to inform Cedric is motivated by his sense of fairness and tendency
to do what he thinks is right regardless of the rules. His decision is a form of cooperation.
While Harry likely was not thinking about the situation explicitly in terms of “If I help
Cedric now, he’ll feel obligated to help me later,” Harry tends to make decisions based
on what he perceives to be fair – whether this entails informing the fourth tournament
participant or getting back at Malfoy for whatever he did. This is another example of a
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game with outcomes that are not easily quantified, as in the game Chicken. Although
Harry’s outcomes cannot be quantified easily, his desire to do the right thing is still a very
real motivation.
The fact that Cedric is the other Hogwarts champion could also have played a role
in this decision. Because he did not even want to enter, Harry does not care much about
winning. It only makes sense that he would be rooting for the other Hogwarts champion
to win if he doesn’t. Additionally, the fact that they are both from Hogwarts and have
generally been on good terms in the past could have increased the trust between them,
which is essential for cooperation to take place.
Cedric is the first to learn how to decipher the clue of the second task. He explicitly
states that he gives Harry a hint because he feels obligated to return the favor from the
previous task, so it is clear that in this case Harry’s previous cooperation paid off greatly
for him.
This is only one of the many examples of the applications of game theory to the
Triwizard Tournament. For further reading, Highfield’s The Science of Harry Potter
discusses a few other Harry Potter plot lines in terms of game theory, including Harry’s
decisions made during the second Triwizard task [8].
6 Conclusion
Game theory is all around us, from our favorite stories, to our everyday decisions, to
the critical negotiations made by global leaders. Nearly anywhere a decision is being
made, the situation can be examined with game theoretical concepts. This paper has
only explored a basic overview of game theory; when it is applied in the real world the
problems become far more complicated and challenging to define. For further reading on
the basic definitions and concepts of game theory, see Stahl’s A Gentle Introduction to
Game Threory, and for more on everyday applications see Fisher’s Rock, Paper, Scissors:
21
Game Theory in Everyday Life [1, 6].
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